Legacy carriers operate hub-and-spoke networks because they believe that such networks offer demand and cost advantages, which allow the hub carrier to charge a higher price. However, some empirical studies have found that the hub premium has declined in recent years. This study examines hub-and-spoke networks to assess the change in the hub premium over time. It uses a structural model to jointly estimate the demand and supply parameters. Then, a counterfactual exercise is carried out to capture the impact of low-cost carriers (LCCs) on hub carriers' premiums under different economic conditions. The major finding is that, on average, consumers respond differently when facing a price change by a legacy carrier and by an LCC. However, this price sensitivity reduces in the later years of the study period. Further, we show that legacy carriers dominated airfares in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, the growing expansion of LCCs is significantly harming the economies of density of legacy carriers.
Introduction
The rapid changes in demand and market structure over the past two decades have challenged the premium on hub-and-spoke networks. 1 Legacy carriers operate hub-and-spoke networks because they believe that such networks offer 1 In a hub-and-spoke network, a hub refers to an airport in which a carrier concentrates its operations and services, while the spoke airports from other cities in the network have non-stop flights only to the hub. Therefore, hub-and-spoke networks drive up markup and increase entry barriers (Borenstein, 1991) [5] . However, the revolution of low-cost carriers (LCCs) has steadily placed downward pressure on airfares. 3 Since Southwest Airlines started to provide low-fare regional services in the 1970s, LCCs have had a growing impact on the air travel business. Dresner et al. (1996) [6] were one of the first groups to examine how the entry of LCCs influenced competitive routes, while Morrison (2001) [7] focused on the impact of Southwest Airlines on incumbent airlines' fares. Both studies suggest that the presence of LCCs has placed downward pressure on airfares. Hence, LCCs force legacy carriers to lower fares by offering competing services, especially in regional markets. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) [8] further indicated that incumbent airlines cut fares in response to the 2 The major legacy carriers in the domestic US airline industry are American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways. [11] as well as lower profitability. Figure 1 shows the domestic revenue passenger miles in the US airline industry, highlighting that the gap between legacy carriers and LCCs has closed markedly over the past two decades. Moreover, stricter security regulations have lengthened average travel time, which may cause flight delays and airport congestion. Indeed, Ater (2012) [14] found a statistically significant relationship between hub-and-spoke networks and congestion, which could lower consumers' preferences for products from legacy carriers.
The evidence presented thus far suggests that the challenge to legacy carriers is a complicated combination of two major factors: 1) the expansion of LCCs and 2) rapid changes in demand and market structure. Therefore, this study reexamines hub-and-spoke operations over time to understand the degree to which such networks have been disturbed by LCCs based on changes in legacy carriers' airfares. Because a legacy carrier needs to hold the equilibrium price in Figure 1 . US airline domestic revenue passenger miles. 
Data
The quarterly dataset comes from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B Market) collected by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics in the United States.
These data constitute a 10% sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers.
Each observation is a flight itinerary that includes information such as the identity of the airline, airfare, number of passengers that purchase the specific itinerary, miles flown on the trip itinerary, and origin and destination airports.
In this study, an air travel product is defined as the combination of trip itinerary and airline. A market is defined as directional air travel between the origin and destination city. Note that the city-pair definition of a market in this study differs from that in Berry and Jia (2010) [13] . As the present research aims to identify the effect of LCCs on the performance of legacy carriers, it is necessary to consider local competitors, especially in a large city. 4 Brueckner et al. (2013) [9] stated, for example, that LCCs have a significant impact on pricing regardless of whether the competition occurs on the airport-pair or at adjacent airports.
The data in this study are focused on US domestic flights offered and operated by US carriers in the first quarters of 1998, 2005, and 2012. Observations with missing airfares and airfares less than $50 and over $3000 are omitted because of the high probability that they may be data entry coding errors or discounted fares that may be related to passengers using accumulated frequent-flyer miles to offset the full travel cost. Meanwhile, a product needs to have at least five passengers purchasing it during the quarter and a market needs to include products provided by both legacy carriers and LCCs to be included in the analysis. To collapse the data based on the definition of a product in this study, the mean price is used for each distinct itinerary-carrier combination, while the quantity variable is the sum of those passengers that purchase the product. Table 1 defines all the variables used in this study, while the summary statistics of the sample data are reported in Table 2 
Model
The differentiated products framework allows us to draw conclusions about how prices relate to costs compared with the less precise estimates derived from reduced form regressions. The challenge in using such an aggregated dataset is the lack of information about passengers' travel purpose. is a random component of utility common across all products within the same group/airline, whereas the term ijm ε is an independently and identically distributed random error term across products, consumers, and markets. Note that 0,1, 2, , g G =  indexes product groups within a market and one outside alternative (g = 0). The outside alternative is the option not to purchase one of the air travel products considered in the model. The parameter σ lies between 0 and 1 and measures the correlation of consumer utility across products belonging to the same group/airline g. The correlation of preferences increases as σ approaches 1. In the case where σ is 0, the model collapses to a standard logit model where products compete symmetrically.
The market share for type t consumers,
, of product j is simply the multiplication of the group share by the within-group share, which is given by ( )
where
G is the set of products belonging to group g. Then, the market share of product j is the weighted average across the two types of consumers:
where λ is the proportion of leisure (type L) consumers in the population and ( ) j markup x p ξ θ is the product markup function that depends exclusively on the demand-side variables and parameter estimates. With these computed product markups, the product's marginal costs can be recovered by
where w is the matrix of the observed marginal cost-shifting variables, including Itinerary Distance, Distance Squared, Hub Dummy, the operating carrier dummies, and the other relative cost-shifting variables. γ is a vector of the cost parameters to be estimated, while η is a vector of the cost shocks unobserved by researchers.
While the demand and marginal cost parameters can be estimated jointly by GMM, the price elasticity of demand can be computed as well. As such, we can compare consumers' sensitivity to price changes according to their type for the different hub premiums and years. Having estimated the demand and marginal cost parameters for each year, we can compute the predicted markup and marginal cost and then the counterfactual experiments can be carried out. [12] . Consistent with the findings of previous studies, the positive HUB_Origin coefficient indicates that a consumer's utility tends to increase if the origin airport is the carrier's hub. In addition, the signifi- Table 4 reports the summary statistics on the price elasticity estimates across all products and by the different categories. Starting the specification in 1998, the mean price elasticity estimate generated by our demand model is −1.6338. This result means that a 1% increase in the price of one product would result in a 1.6338% decrease in its demand. The mean price elasticity estimated for type L and type B consumers is −5.35 and −0.67, respectively. As expected, type L consumers are relatively more price sensitive.
Empirical Results

Parameter Estimates
Price Elasticity of Demand
On average, consumers respond differently when facing price changes by legacy carriers and LCCs. Overall, a 1% increase in price causes consumers to decrease their demand for a legacy carrier's product and an LCC's product by 1.57% and 1.78%, respectively. However, the price sensitivity gap reduces in 2005 and 2012 compared with 1998. Further, consumers are less price sensitive in long-haul markets compared with short-haul and mid-haul markets, perhaps because they may not easily find an alternative option for a long-haul itinerary.
This finding is consistent throughout the study period.
Markup and Marginal Cost
The joint estimates in the demand-and-supply structure framework allow us to compute the product-level markups and marginal costs precisely. The mean estimates of the markups and marginal costs are presented in Table 5 . The results
show that a product has a larger markup and a smaller marginal cost in 2012 compared with 1998. Specifically, a legacy carrier's product, on average, faces a higher marginal cost and a higher markup compared with an LCC's product.
However, the markup on an LCC's products grows at a faster rate compared with that of the legacy carrier's products.
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Counterfactual Exercise
The counterfactual exercise is carried out to assess the impact of LCCs' products on the pricing of legacy carriers' products and evaluate the extent of the threat to hub-and-spoke networks. To disclose the effect, we remove the LCCs' products from each sample market to allow the predicted equilibrium prices for legacy carriers' products to be estimated by assuming a 5% increase in marginal cost.
This increase is based on the fact that the marginal cost of transferring passengers from a legacy product should increase if the market has fewer products. For example, a legacy carrier needs to provide more flights to accommodate passengers' needs, which require extra costs such as labor and fuel.
The findings of the comparison between the actual prices and predicted equilibrium prices of legacy carriers' products are summarized in Table 6 . In 1998, the predicted equilibrium price, on average, increases by $128 if the LCCs' products are counterfactually removed. This positive power suggests that legacy carriers dominate airfares in that year. If the market lacks LCCs' products, the degree of market power on the legacy's products rises. Specifically, the degree of market power seems to grow in long-haul distance markets compared with short-haul markets.
However, the opposing pressure exists in 2005, and this negative magnitude becomes larger in 2012, perhaps sowing to economies of density. If the markets remove LCCs' products counterfactually, the existing airline should be able to better arrange passengers from different origins and with different destinations on a single large plane for a segment of the trip, which has a downward effect on pricing. In practice, however, because LCCs' products exist in the markets, legacy carriers cannot fully exploit this density power. Since 2012, the competition between legacy carriers and LCCs has become more intense, gradually hampering hub-and-spoke networks. As such, legacy carriers need to raise their airfares in order to retain the anticipated markup. Therefore, a legacy carrier may consider reforming its hubbing network as an efficient way in which to overcome the pricing pressure from the rise of LCCs.
Conclusions
Recent research has highlighted the hubbing effect of hub-and-spoke networks, which should give carriers sufficient competitive advantage to increase their share of products at the hub and create airport dominance. However, while passengers still find it more convenient to choose itineraries offered by hub airlines and benefit from frequent-flyer membership with a hub airline, this study investigates the extent to which the presence of LCCs has influenced the dominance of network carriers. The empirical results imply pricing strategies and solutions for legacy carriers.
Their competitive advantage has declined compared with LCCs in recent years.
Hence, LCCs gradually limit legacy carriers' ability to realize the benefits of hub-and-spoke networks. To counter the aggressive expansion of LCCs, legacy carriers should thus reform their hubbing networks in an efficient way to exploit economies of density fully.
